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I.      INTRODUCTION 
With the rise of branding and marketing, firms started using trade 
dress such as product features or packages to identify themselves. 
Some firms claim an exclusive trademark right on their trade dress. 
However, granting a trademark right to some trade dresses might 
hinder competition. For example, if one firm claims trademark on the 
heart-shaped candy box, it will prevent others from using the same 
package to compete in the Valentine’s Day sweets market.1 So U.S. 
courts developed a doctrine called aesthetic functionality to avoid the 
competition hindrance consequence. Aesthetic functionality refers to 
the situation where a trade dress has the aesthetic value and 
consumers buy the product largely due to that value.2 Once a court 
decides a trade dress, such as the heart-shaped box, is aesthetically 
functional, the trade dress cannot be a trademark owned by any one 
firm, and every firm can use it in the market. U.S. courts use aesthetic 
functionality as a legal ground to reject trademark protection of a trade 
dress when granting such protection would unfairly disadvantage 
competitors.3 
However, since the birth of the aesthetic functionality doctrine, 
commentators and judges have criticized it for two primary reasons. 
First, the doctrine does not provide a clear test when the competition 
is hindered. McCarthy insisted that “aesthetic functionality is an 
inappropriate response to a valid concern.”4 Litman asserted “no tests 
can properly determine the functionality in the aesthetic sense.”5  Tal 
contended “It should not be within the purview of a judge to determine 
when some aesthetic feature is so desirable as to prevent others from 
entering the marketplace and when it is not.”6 Other commentators 
have frequently observed that courts applied the doctrine 
inconsistently,7 which highlights the lack of guidance provided by the 
doctrine. 
 
1. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §742 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., 1938).  
2. Id.  
3. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
4. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 7.81 at 256-57 
(4th ed. 2010). 
5. Jessica Litman, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement under 
Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 88 (1982). 
6. Noa Tal, Aesthetic Functionality: Trademark Law’s Red Herring Doctrine, 22 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 25, 45 (2013). 
7. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys) functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011); Justin Hughes, 
Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2014). 
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Second, an overbroad application of the doctrine might threat the 
protection for trade dress as a source indicator and therefore 
undermine the legitimate source identification goals of trademark 
law.8  For example, if courts use the doctrine to reject trademark 
protection for T-Mobile’s magenta color and other phone service stores 
can use the same color, then consumers will spend more time trying to 
identify T-Mobile stores. Tal argued that denying protection to 
attractive product or service features “will simply force buyers and 
sellers to invent new methods for proving and displaying 
authenticity . . . [that will] certainly be more costly.”9 
Despite these criticisms, courts continuously use this doctrine to 
police competition.10  A recent case, In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, 
Inc (“Florists”)11, demonstrates this trend. Florists’ Transworld 
Delivery, Inc., claimed trademark rights in their black packaging box, 
which it used to hold and transport flowers. The Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (TTAB) of United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) refused the registration, claiming the color black was 
aesthetically functional because “[B]lack communicates elegance or 
luxury. . . Besides, the evidence reflects that black has significance on 
somber occasions such as in the context of death.”12 Were black 
registered and protected as a color trademark, the trademark owner 
would capture many consumers preferring flowers in black boxes, 
especially in the funeral context. Moreover, the trademark owner 
 
8. Some courts and scholars also mentioned that overboard aesthetic functionality would 
disincentivize the creation of designs: “The difficulty with accepting such a broad view of 
aesthetic functionality. . .is that it provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and 
attractive design.” Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). 
However, this argument has been rejected by U.S. Supreme Court. in Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 1262 
(“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a 
particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”).  
9. Tal, supra note 6, at 51 (alteration in original). 
10. Courts applied the doctrine in many cases from early 20 century to today. See Flagg Mfg. 
Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901); Viavi Co. v. Vimedia Co., 245 F. 289, 293 (1917); 
Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1938); JC Penney Co. v. HD Lee 
Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th 
Cir. 1952); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Mogen 
David Wine Corporation, 328 F.2d 925,931-933 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 
1042, 1048-1049 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988); Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Sabert Corp. v. Ullman Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1597 
(1999); Johnson & Johnson v. Actavis Group hf, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1125, 2008 WL 228061, 
2 (S.D. N.Y. 2008), as corrected, (Feb. 21, 2008); Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent 
America, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
11. In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc. 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1784, 1796-1797 (T.T.A.B. 
2013).  
12. Id.  
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would be able to raise prices, as other flower service suppliers could 
not legally sell flowers in black boxes. 
The tension between the aesthetic functionality doctrine’s 
usefulness and criticisms of this doctrine follows from the doctrine’s 
historical development. By tracing historical cases, this article answers 
the following questions: Should courts stick to this doctrine despite the 
criticisms? What are the doctrine’s problems today? Where should the 
doctrine be headed? This article argues that courts should keep this 
doctrine because (1) the doctrine’s necessity roots in a valid concern of 
monopoly; and (2) courts have gradually developed three 
elements(inquiries) to determine whether a trade dress is aesthetically 
functional: (a) Does the disputed trade dress confer a de-facto 
aesthetic advantage? (b) Are alternative designs sufficient substitutes 
for the disputed trade dress? (c) Is the disputed trade dress’s 
attractiveness due to the producer’s reputation? These three elements 
constitute a clear test for courts to apply the doctrine. And the third 
element reduces the doctrine’s threat on trade dress as a source 
indicator. 
Unfortunately, the current judicial treatment of the three elements 
of the aesthetic functionality test is intuitive and speculative. This 
article argues all three elements require adequate empirical evidence. 
In the absence of an expressly empirical approach, the doctrine has 
stagnated. But this problem is not unsolvable in the future. To improve 
this doctrine, the article suggests empirical methods to test the three 
issues. 
II.     MONOPOLY CONCERN AND THE FUNCTIONALITY 
DOCTRINE’S NECESSITY 
The doctrine of (aesthetic) functionality was necessary from the 
inception of trademarks and trademark law. In medieval England, 
trademark evolved from production mark, which was the monopoly 
tool of medieval guilds in England. At the time, some judges recognized 
trademarks to be a form of monopoly. Monopoly concerns existed 
inherently in early trademark infringement cases. Later, these 
concerns materialized in the doctrine of (aesthetic) functionality in 
trade dress protection. 
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A. The Early History of Trademark Law – What is a Trademark in 
Modern Common Law? 
In medieval England, marks called “merchants’ marks” and 
“production marks” were attached to products.13 Merchants’ marks 
were used by merchants to indicate ownership of the physical goods in 
transit.14 By these marks, the merchants claimed physical goods 
shipped at sea.15 
A production mark, on the other hand, was attached to a product 
to indicate which craftsman manufactured the product; this was often 
called a “mark of origin.”16 If the product was ill-made, the craftsman 
could be tracked down and punished by his guild.17 In addition, guilds 
also used production marks to control the output and to prevent 
competition from craftsmen outside the guild.18 
However, neither merchants’ marks nor production marks were 
true modern trademarks. A modern trademark (1) indicates the source 
of the goods rather than evidences ownership of the goods;19 and (2) 
represents a positive asset (good will or reputation) rather than a 
potential liability to a controlling guild.20 Merchants’ marks were not 
used to show consumers the source/producer but served as ownership 
evidence of physical goods. Production marks were marks of origin, 
but goodwill/reputation did not necessarily attach to production 
marks.  They were merely a private means of internal control. 
Modern trademarks evolved from production marks.21 The change 
began before 17th century in England22, when national and 
international markets first developed. Production marks became 
valuable symbols representing goodwill/reputation.23 Protecting a 
trademark as a right against counterfeits became necessary. In a 
 
 
13.Frank I. Schechter, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 4-40 
(1925).  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 20. 
20. Id. at 38. 
21. Id. at 128-131. 
22. Id. at 128-131. 
23. Id. at 129. 
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statute24 aimed at the textile trade, Parliament indicated that a mark 
was a privilege instead of a mandatory duty, saying “it shall and may be 
lawful to and for every trader, dealer and weaver of linen manufacture, 
to weave his name, or fix some known mark in any piece of linen 
manufacture by him made, if he shall so think fit”, 25 and if someone 
infringes such a mark, redress should be made to the owner: “[H]e 
shall forfeit; the sum of one hundred pounds, for the use of the person, 
whose mark shall be so counterfeited. . .”.26 
The seeds of modern trademark law were sowed even earlier than 
the 17th century.  The first common law action protecting a trademark 
was JG v. Samford in 1584, a case involving an infringement on a 
clothier’s trademark.27 The plaintiff clothier had gained an outstanding 
reputation, and another clothier used the plaintiff’s mark on his ill-
made cloth to pretend the cloth was the plaintiff’s. The judge decided 
that the case was actionable. The case was cited in dictum in Southern 
v. How in 1618, relating to sales of counterfeit jewels.28 Another two 
17th century cases related to trademarks were Waldron v. Hill in 1659, 
involving a scythe-maker, who brought an action for the use of his 
mark, and W.E. v. R. M. in 1670 relating to cheese-making.29 
Since modern trademarks evolved from production marks, some 
early modern trademarks still had the function of facilitating guilds in 
order to control production. So judges of that time considered 
trademarks monopolies. Thus, monopoly concern inherently existed in 
early trademark cases, as presented in Darcy v. Allen in 160230 and 
Blanchard v. Hill in 1742.31 The following section will elaborate on 
these two cases. 
 
24. The Linen and Hempen Manufacturers (Scotland) Act 1726, 13 George I, c.26. 
25. Schechter, supra note 13, at 128. 
26. Id. 
27. Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the Conceptualisation 
of Trademarks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY-A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
3 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).  
28. Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to 
Schechter’s Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505 (1997). 
29. Bently, supra note 27. 
30. Darcy v. Allen (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.).  
31. Blanchard v. Hill (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 2 Atk. 484.  
AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY AT A CROSSROADS 5/29/2020  6:59 PM 
364 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.  Vol 19:3 
B. Monopoly Concern in Early Trademark Law 
i. Monopoly Concern and the Tort Approach 
Anti-monopoly sentiment at the dawn of trademark law stemmed 
from the decline of English guilds, which had emphasized orderly 
trading and resource control rather than free competition.32 
Additionally, tensions between the Crown and Parliament arose over 
royal trade privileges, where favored courtiers were given (or 
purchased) exclusive trading rights.33 At the time, the term “monopoly” 
was used not only in the economic sense, but also referred to the royal 
privileges granted to individuals with certain trade advantages. 
For example, the Crown could grant an exclusive right, called a 
“patent,” to practice a trade which others could not practice.34 In 1571, 
Robert Bell questioned royal trade privileges in the House of 
Commons, stating that “by Licences a few only were enriched, and the 
multitude impoverished.”35 As opposition to royal “patents” and other 
mercantilist practices grew, Elizabeth I and Parliament achieved a 
compromise where Elizabeth I revoked a few unpopular monopolies 
and agreed to have other cases subjected to the common law courts.36 
Anti-monopoly sentiment peaked in the famous Case of 
Monopolies (Darcy v. Allen) in 1602,37 a test case to void a patent to 
exclusively import, make, and sell playing cards.38 According to Coke’s 
report, the court voided the patent because it was “an abrogation of the 
right of all subjects to engage in a trade and as a harm to the public in 
the form of reduced employment and higher prices”.39 Darcy v. Allen 
looks a bit like a modern anti-trust case and illustrated the growing 
pro-competition nature of English law.  The case influenced a later 
trademark case, Blanchard v. Hill40, in 1742, which voided a trademark 
on the grounds that the charter on which the trademark was based 
was “a plain monopoly.”41 
 
32. Schechter, supra note 13, at 4-40.  
33. Id. 
34. Thomas Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 Va. L. Rev. 
1313, 1327-1333 (2005). 
35. Id. at 1328.   
36. Id. at 1329-1333.  
37. Darcy v. Allen (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 11 Co. Rep. 84 b (KB). 
38. Nachbar, supra note 34, at 1355.  
39. Id. at 1327. 
40. Blanchard v. Hill (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 2 Atk. 484 (Ch). 
41. Schechter, supra note 13, at 136. 
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Blanchard v. Hill was litigated after Darcy v. Allen, and after the 
Statute [Against] Monopolies was passed in England in 1624. In 1628, 
Charles I, granted a charter to a Company to produce playing cards and 
forbad the import of foreign playing cards.42 “Companies” were similar 
to guilds, which were given special privileges in trades. The Company 
used trademarks to manage production. Company members had to 
submit a 2-shilling duty per gross pack to the king.43 To facilitate the 
duty’s collection, each member had to have a mark enrolled in the 
Company office and attached to each pack’s wrapper.44 
The system operated for over a century, until 1742 when 
Christopher Blanchard, a Company member, sought to enforce the 
mark “THE GREAT MOGUL” against Thomas Hill, who was not a 
member, but who used the MOGUL mark on his playing cards.45 
Blanchard applied for injunctive relief against Hill before the Court of 
Chancery.46 
To Lord Hardwicke, the case was not a pure trademark case but 
an illegal monopoly case, because the disputed mark was a vehicle to 
enforce the Company’s exclusive rights in the playing card market. 
Lord Hardwicke examined the clauses in the company charter upon 
which the marks were established and asserted that (1) the charter 
itself was an illegal monopoly47 and (2) the mark established by this 
charter was void.48 He asserted there was no prior case restraining one 
trader from using another’s mark unless there was fraudulent design.49 
However, he did not think the defendant had a fraudulent intent.50 
In rejecting Blanchard’s plea, the case exemplifies the anti-
monopoly concern by condemning the trading companies’ or guilds’ 
anti-competitive ends. Moreover, Blanchard suggests that – even in the 
absence of an illegal mercantile cartel – a single trademark owner had 
 
42. Norma Dawson, English Trade Mark Law in the Eighteenth Century: Blanchard v Hill 
Revisited-Another ‘Case of Monopolies’, 24 J. Legal Hist. 111, 122-126 (2003).  
43. Id.  
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 118-122. 
46. Id. 
47. Lord Hardwicke pointed out that “the design of granting this charter was to raise a sum 
of money for the crown”, and the clause “prohibiting the importation of cards from foreign parts” 
was illegal and the clause “that confines the making of cards to London and ten miles about it, 
which is a plain monopoly, and directly against law”. Blanchard, 2 Atk. 484, 485, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 
(Ch.). Some scholars pointed out Lord Hardwicke was influenced by Darcy v. Allein. Schechter, 
supra note 13.  
48. Blanchard v. Hill, (1742) 2 Atk. 484, 485 (Ch), 26 Eng. Rep. 692. 
49. Blanchard, 2 Atk. 484, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch.). 
50. Id. 
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no exclusive property right to his mark, but rather merely protection 
against fraudulent competition. Courts followed this approach, 
although later guilds gradually faded. Courts no longer worried about 
the guilds’ monopoly power, but rather the trademark owners’ power 
of preventing other firms from competing freely. 
From the beginning of trademark law’s development, judges 
hesitated to see trademarks as traditional private property.51 What 
they wanted to protect was the fair business order that producer’s 
consumers were not unfairly transferred to others.52 Trademark 
imitation was actionable as a fraud tort claim. The plaintiff needed to 
prove a defendant’s intent to indicate that its products were those of 
the plaintiff. Fraudulent intent was at the heart of the deceit action.53 
ii. The Realistic Need to Protect Trademark Right and the Property 
Approach 
The fraud tort approach had a practical issue: When the 
fraudulent intent was difficult to prove, or the fraudulent intent did not 
exist, the claim could not be supported. Some judges shifted to a 
property approach. They considered the trademark as the plaintiff’s 
property and did not require fraudulent intent. In Millington v. Fox in 
183854, the defendant’s business was outside England and he did not 
know the plaintiff’s marks.55 The case was decided in the court of 
equity. Lord Chancellor Cottenham held that the trademark 
infringement should be enjoined even in the absence of intent to 
defraud.56 He stated that: 
[H]aving previously come to the conclusion that there was 
sufficient in the case to shew that the Plaintiffs had a title to the 
marks in question; and they undoubtedly had a right to the 
assistance of a Court of Equity to enforce that title. At the same 
time, the case is very different from the cases of this kind which 
 
51. Lord Hardwicke distinguished JG v. Samford, in which the imitation of a cloth mark was 
held actionable. He characterized Samford as “not the single act of making use of the mark. . . but 
doing it with fraudulent design, to put off bad cloths by this means, or to draw away customers 
from the other clothier.” Bently, supra note 27. 
52. Schechter, supra note 13; Bently, supra note 27.  
53. Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 Am. J. Legal 
Hist. 405 (1995).   
54. Millington v. Fox (1838) 40 Eng. Rep. 956 3 My. & Cr. 338 (Ch.). 
55. The case failed to discuss actual or likelihood of confusion either. See Millington, 40 Eng. 
Rep. 3 My. & Cr. 338.  
56. Schechter, supra note 13, at 138-139.  
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usually occur, where there has been a fraudulent use, by one 
person, of the trade marks or names used by another trader.57 
Millington marked a trend that sought to protect trademarks as 
property without evidence of fraudulent intent. This move toward 
propertization of trademarks was confirmed in Edelsten v. Edelsten, 
which differentiated the two kinds of cases and asserted that in a court 
of law the remedy was by action on deceit, but in the court of equity a 
trademark could be protected without proving fraud on the part of the 
defendant.58 These two approaches – the tort approach and the 
property approach – co-existed at that time. 
iii. The Compromising between the Tort Approach and the 
Property Approach 
Each approach had its weakness. It was difficult to prove 
fraudulent intent in some cases when applying the tort approach. The 
property approach would significantly extend the strength and scope 
of trademark protection, sometimes threatening to stifle free 
competition. Both approaches evolved to address their weakness. 
Judges applying the tort approach became satisfied with an 
assumed fraud intent evident by the resemblance of two marks.59  For 
example, in Edelstein v. Vick (1853)60, the Vice Chancellor Wood stated 
that: 
I agree with the argument on the part of the Defendant there 
must be an intention to deceive the public, or this Court will not 
interfere . . .[however] It is impossible to look into the minds of 
the Defendants, or to detect their secret motives. The question 
rather is whether their acts were such as were likely to mislead 
the public. It is, I think, enough to say that, considering all the 
points of resemblance between the sheets and labels of the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants in character, colour and otherwise, 
a jury would be bound to assume that it had not been the result of 
a fortuitous occurrence of events, but had arisen from design.61 
On the other hand, judges who relied on property rhetoric did not 
treat trademarks as an absolute property. They required proof of 
actual (or likelihood of) deception or confusion, which was not 
 
57. Millington, 40 Eng. Rep. 3 My. & Cr. 338 at 352 (second emphasis added). 
58. Bently, supra note 27, at 14-15, 21.  
59. Not surprisingly, the prevalence of free-trade ideology in late 19th century prompted 
other judges to push back against the concept of a trademark as an exclusive, private 
property. Bently, supra note 27. 
60. Edelstein v. Vick, (1853) 68 Eng. Rep. 1194, 11 Hare, 78. 
61. Id. at 84-85 (second emphasis added) (alteration in original).  
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required in a tangible property claim. For example, although the court 
in Edelsten v. Edelsten, claimed that it would “act on the principle of 
protecting property alone, and it is not necessary for injunction to 
prove fraud in the defendant.”62 The court was eventually satisfied 
with the likelihood of deception provided by the resemblance of the 
two marks.63 This case suggests that judges cabined the property claim 
within the right to protect a plaintiff’s trademark against unfair 
(deceptive) transferring. The property right judges described was not 
based on the trademark’s exclusive use. 
To summarize, early trademark cases were based on fraud tort 
claims, but later property rhetoric emerged to police cases where 
deceptive intent either did not exist or was difficult to prove. The fraud 
tort approach was finally satisfied with the assumed fraud intent, as 
indicated by the two marks’ resemblance. The property approach 
eventually relied on deception likelihood provided by two marks’ 
resemblance, which was not required in a tangible property claim. 
Both approaches arrived at a place where the misleading similarities 
between two marks were essential to the case. 
iv. The Tort (unfair competition) Approach and the Property 
Approach in US Trademark Law 
Trademark law in the United States has a similar history. 
Increasing trade and business prosperity led to an expanded need for 
trademark protection, often accompanied by traditional property 
rhetoric. The property approach and the tort approach also co-existed 
in early U.S. trademark cases, reflected by technical trademark 
(defined below) and non-technical trademark (defined below) 
concepts. In the 19th century, courts started to protect technical 
trademarks as property. Expressing monopoly concerns, they did not 
extend property-like protection to non-technical marks. 
One can understand “technical trademarks” and “non-technical 
trademarks” through a later case, Abercrombie.64 In Abercrombie, the 
court classified trademarks according to the level of distinctiveness. 
Fanciful marks refer to those terms invented such as ”PEPSI”, 
“KODAK”, and “EXXON”. Arbitrary marks refer to terms in common 
language but not describing the quality or characters of the designated 
 
62. Edelsten v. Edelsten, (1863) 1 De G J & S 185; 7 LT 768 at 769. 
63. Id. 
64. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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goods/services (e.g. APPLE for computers). Suggestive marks refer to 
terms indirectly describing the product quality or features (e.g. “BLUE 
RAY” on data service). Descriptive marks are marks directly describing 
the quality or characters (e.g. “SOFT” on wool sweaters). Generic terms 
are the common name of a product or a service such as “CIGAR” on 
cigarettes. Abercrombie claimed that fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive 
marks are inherently distinctive and should get trademark protection, 
while descriptive marks have no inherent distinctiveness and thus 
receive protection only when they acquire the secondary meaning to 
identify the sources. Generic terms are not protectable as they do not 
identify the sources. 
In early U.S. trademark cases, “Technical trademarks” were close 
to fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive marks in Abercrombie’s 
classification.65 Courts found technical marks inherently distinctive 
and could immediately identify the sources. Courts treated technical 
trademarks more like traditional property. Initially, in technical 
trademark cases, deceptive intent was not required.66 
“Non-technical marks” were descriptive qualities or attributes, 
generic words, geographical terms, and personal names.67 These marks 
are close to “descriptive marks” and “generic terms” in the 
Abercrombie classification.68 Courts were reluctant to allow any 
individual to monopolize nontechnical marks as property,69 so they 
asserted such marks could only be protected by unfair competition 
principles, a tort similar to a deceit action in England.70 
 
65. Callmann used the Abercrombie classification to explain early US trademark categories. 
In Abercrombie, trademarks were classified into four categories according to distinctiveness: 
fanciful and arbitrary marks, suggestive marks, descriptive marks and generic terms. Fanciful and 
arbitrary marks, suggestive marks are protected per se. Descriptive marks are protected only if 
an acquired distinctiveness are proved. Generic terms are not protectable. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976); Rudolf Callmann, Louis Altman & Malla 
Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, § 17A:4 (4th ed. 1981); 
Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 
Trademark Rep. 305, 316 (1979). 
66. McClure, supra note 65, at 317. 
67. McClure, supra note 65, at 316.  
68. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d 4 at 13. 
69. Some prevalent ideas might influence judges understanding of anti-competitive 
consequence of trademarks.  Francis Upton, in 1860, in A Treaties on The Law of Trademarks 
advised that an exclusive right to anything was a monopoly and would restrict the individual’s 
freedom of trade. He asserted that the exclusive property in trademarks should be applied with 
extremist caution. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev.325 (1980). 
70. McClure, supra note 65, at 318. 
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This division was claimed in Apollo v. Perkins (1913). The judge 
asserted that “a technical trade-mark is treated as property. . .; but 
where a technical trade-mark right is not established (a non-technical 
trademark), and fraud-unfair competition-in the use of the mark must 
be proved.”71 
However, such division was blurring even at the beginning, 
evidenced by the wording of Apollo v. Perkins. The judge treated 
technical trademarks as property but he still considered the violation 
as “an infringement thereof carries with it the presumption of fraud”72 
On the other side, in non-technical trademark cases, proving an actual 
fraud intent was not a must. Litigants could justify the fraud intent by 
“the inevitable consequences”.73 This blurring reflects that courts 
really wished to ease the plaintiff’s burden to prove the fraud intent. 
However, due to the fear of monopoly, they fell well short of 
establishing a traditional property right in a trademark. 
C. Monopoly Concern in Trade Dress Protection and the Emergence 
of Functionality Doctrine 
Concerns about monopoly can be seen most clearly in cases 
involving “trade dress,” where the plaintiff claimed the shape of its 
product or style of its packaging as a source indicator. Later, the 
functionality doctrine emerged in the end of 19th and early 20th 
century as a serious limitation on the trade dress protection. 
i. The Concept of Trade Dress 
The modern term “trade dress” has been used to mean (1) the 
appearance of a product’s packaging, (2) the appearance of a product 
itself, and (3) a business’s entire image, including service or some 
subset of the total image.74 In the 19th century, it was recognized that 
trade dress could indicate origin through extensive use and 
advertisement.  Courts recognized a legitimate need to protect trade 
dress against fraudulent imitation. 
 
71. Apollo Bros. v. Perkins, 207 F. 530 (3rd Cir. 1913). 
72. Id. 
73. In Elgin v. Illinois (1901), the US Supreme Court clarified this point in dictum: “. . .where 
an alleged trade mark is not in itself a good trade-mark [non-technical mark]. . .such 
circumstances must be made out as will show wrongful intent in fact or justify that inference from 
the inevitable consequences if the act complained of.” Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case 
Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901) (alteration in original). 
74. Callmann, Altman & Pollack, supra note 65, §19.1. 
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ii. The Compromise in Both Fraud Tort Approach and Property 
Approach 
Courts generally treated trade dress as a non-technical trademark. 
Trade dress protection was based on an unfair competition (fraud tort) 
approach. In Dixon v. Guggenheim (1870), the court found a package 
was not a technical trademark, but the defendant’s stove polish 
packages were a fraudulent imitation of the plaintiff’s based on 
similarities in the size, shape, and labels.75 
A few courts described trade dress as property, but the property 
right was not treated as exclusive. First, courts frequently discussed 
fraudulent intent to justify an injunction. Second, judges often required 
a likelihood of consumer confusion before issuing an injunction. In 
Cook v. Starkweather (1872), the court found the plaintiff had acquired 
a property interest in the barrel’s peculiar design.76 The property right 
invasion was evident from the trade dresses’ similarities, which 
probably misled consumers.77 
Eventually, regardless of the unfair competition or “property” 
labels, courts focused on whether the trade dress similarity would 
confuse consumers. In unfair competition, fraudulent intention was 
evidenced by a misleading resemblance, and in property-style cases 
the invasion of the right was also supported by a misleading 
resemblance. Both approaches reached a point where the misleading 
resemblance was essential to the case. 
Compared with a pure tort approach, the misleading resemblance 
standard eased the plaintiff’s burden to prove infringement and 
accordingly strengthened trade dress protection. Compared with a 
pure property approach, the standard promised to protect trade dress 
only when the misleading was likely, reducing the monopoly danger. 
However, the standard did not entirely resolve the monopoly concern. 
In some situations, protecting the plaintiff’s trade dress would cause 
potential anti-competitive consequences, even the two trade dresses 
were confusingly similar. This concern was articulated nicely in 
Fairbanks v. Jacobus (1877), where the plaintiff applied for an 
injunction to restrain the appearance of the defendant’s platform 
scales.78 The court admitted that the appearances of the two platforms 
 
75. Dixon Crucible Co. v. Guggenheim, 2 Brewst. 321 (Pa. 1869). 
76. Cook v. Starkweather, 13 Abb. Pr. N.S. 392 (1872). 
77. Id. 
78. Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 8 F. Cas. 951 (1877). 
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were almost impossible to distinguish, but the court asserted that if an 
injunction issued, “. . . all the colors, all the unessential forms, could be 
monopolized as trade-marks, and exclusive rights would be created, 
not limited in time.”79 
iii. The Emergence of Functionality Doctrine 
To avoid monopoly effects while protecting legitimately 
distinctive trade dresses against deceptive imitation, courts developed 
the functionality doctrine from two approaches. One line of cases 
established the doctrine through a tort approach.80 The courts 
distinguished between “necessary” and “unnecessary” parts of trade 
dress. Unnecessary parts were often the ornamental, detailed, minor 
parts of the product, the imitation of which implied fraudulent intent 
and amounted to unfair competition. Necessary parts were the basic or 
mechanical parts of the product, the imitation of which was 
permissible regardless of the copier’s intent. For example, in Enterprise 
Mfg. Co. v. Landers (1904), the judge found that the defendant not only 
copied the size and the general shape of the plaintiff’s coffee mill but 
also imitated its detailed ornamentations.81 The judge held that such 
imitation showed an intent to fraud and was actionable.82 
Other cases analyzed who had the right on a trade dress: the 
public or the producer.83 This was essentially a property approach. If 
the trade dress was the general size, shape, or design, the right to copy 
belonged to the public; therefore, the defendant had the right to 
imitate. If the trade dress was peculiar or out of the ordinary, plaintiff 
might be able to enjoin a confusing imitation. For example, in Globe-
Wernicke Co. v. Fred (1902), a case involving the alleged passing off of 
bookcases, the judge found that competitors had the right to make 
bookcases of any size unless the appearance was peculiar and out of 
the ordinary. The judge claimed that when the public had the right to 
copy, the defendant’s motive was irrelevant.84  . 
 
79. Id. 
80. Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 (2015). 
81. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904). 
82. Id.  
83. Bone, supra note 80. 
84. The judge asserted: “the intention (assumed by the resemblance in size, styles and 
materials) is not material if the defendant has the right to do that which is complained of [e.g. to 
copy the shape of the goods]. On the other hand, if the thing done is wrongful the lack of intention 
would not excuse. In either case, the motive is immaterial to any question involved in the present 
inquiry.” Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 F. 696 (6th Cir. 1902) (alteration in original). 
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The two approaches finally converged on what became known as 
the modern doctrine of “functionality”. The birth of functionality 
doctrine was a natural result of the monopoly concern in trade dress 
protection. However, the evolution of the doctrine, particularly the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine, was a checkered history accompanied 
by criticisms. How did the doctrine survive these criticisms and evolve 
into its current form? The following section will elaborate these 
questions through reviewing cases spanning over 100 years. 
III.     SELF-IMPROVEMENT: THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF 
AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE 
The doctrine faced two weaknesses in its development. First, it 
was and is practically difficult to know the anticompetitive 
consequence of protecting a disputed trade dress. This weakness 
provoked many criticisms on the lack of a clear test mentioned in the 
introduction. Second, the doctrine might chill trade dress protection, 
because a trade dress will lose protection once judges decide it is 
functional. The criticism on the overbroad application of the doctrine 
targeted this weakness. 
Despite these weaknesses, this article argues that courts should 
keep this doctrine because, through common law decision making, 
courts gradually identified three elements to help them apply this 
doctrine. First, courts speculated whether a trade dress would bring a 
de-facto aesthetic advantage (elaborated in Section IV. A) to the 
plaintiff. Second, courts inquired after comparable alternative trade 
dress for the defendant to adopt. These two elements improved the 
determination of potential anti-competitive consequences. Third, 
courts asked whether the attraction of the trade dress was solely 
attributed by the source identified by the trade dress. This element 
reduced the chilling effect on distinctive trade dress as a source 
indicator. The evolution of the modern doctrine of functionality came 
gradually and in several distinct stages. The process indicates that 
courts have made great progress to compensate for the doctrine’s 
weaknesses and they should keep and further improve this doctrine in 
the future. 
A. 1877 to the Restatement of the Law of Torts (First) (1938) 
U.S. case law first developed the doctrine of utilitarian 
functionality, which referred to trade dress with mechanical or useful 
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attributes that helped the product perform. Courts rejected to protect 
such trade dress because of the same concern of monopoly. The 
earliest trademark documents with the word “functional” come from 
1877, when the Patent and Trademark Office rejected the registration 
of “a narrow strip of leaf-tobacco placed as a wrapper around the 
mouth-piece or end of a cigarette” as a trademark.85 The Commissioner 
of Trademarks said that “the mark in question was a functional part of 
the cigarette, and was consumed with it.”86 The Commissioner asserted 
that the trade dress served “a practical and perhaps a very useful 
purpose. Being composed of tobacco, it is an addition to the material of 
the cigarette, strengthens the wrapper, is probably more agreeable to 
the taste than the paper of a cigarette.”87 The Commissioner further 
reasoned that if the trade dress right was given to the applicant, the 
trade would be “seriously embarrassed.”88 
Shortly thereafter, courts developed the aesthetic functionality 
concept, which referred to ornamental trade dress that lacked 
mechanical function but would still hinder competition if trademarked. 
In Coats v. Merrick Thread Co.(1893), the court found it was hard to sell 
a new six-cord thread without the black and gold colored labels 
indicating high quality.89 In Flagg v. Holway (1901), the disputed trade 
dress was the shape of a zither (musical instrument). The court found 
that where the public preferred a product with a particular shape, the 
defendant had the right to satisfy that desire.90 A fuller rationale was 
provided in Heide v. Wallace & Co (1905), where the court explained 
that “by asserting appropriation for that purpose of an especially 
attractive size and shape, a manufacturer could obtain for himself 
alone the advantage to result from the superior attractiveness so 
attained, he might . . .relieve himself from any competition.”91  In Viavi 
v. Vimedia (1917), the court found that “Neither the use of the same 
colors, or of the same form of containing vessels, cartons, or labels, 
alone constitutes unfair competition, especially when these features 
serve (the) purpose of utility, convenience, or attraction.”92 
 
85. In re Jacob Gordon, Vol.12 no.13, Official Gazette. 518 (1877). 
86. Id. at 518. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893). 
90. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901). 
91. Heide v. Wallace Co., 135 F. 346, 347 (1905). 
92. Viavi Co. v. Vimedia Co., 245 F. 289, 293 (1917) (second emphasis added). 
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In this period, courts did not develop detailed elements that 
would help determine whether competition was, in fact, hindered. 
Courts simply decided whether or not the disputed trade dress was 
functional, with little detailed reasoning. No standard tests were 
applied.93 
Once the trade dress was determined to be functional, it was 
declared unprotected. Even when trade dress was non-functional, 
plaintiffs still faced two significant hurdles: (1) the trade dress had to 
have a secondary meaning94 and (2) there had to be a likelihood of 
consumer confusion. 95  Non-functionality, secondary meaning and 
confusion likelihood become three must-have elements to enjoin a 
trade dress imitation. 
B. The Restatement of the Law of Torts (First) 1938 to 1946 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts (First) (“Restatement (First)”) 
was essentially a compilation of tort case law. It also summarized 
previous cases related to the functionality doctrine.  §742 of the 
Restatement (First) explicitly stated that the functionality 
determination was actually a determination regarding whether the 
trade dress protection would hinder competition.96 
 
93. We can find this trend in many cases. See Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827 
(3d Cir. 1916); MJ Lewis Products Co. v. Lewis, 57 F.2d 886 (E.D. Pa. 1931); Coats v. Merrick 
Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893); Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 59 N.E. 667 (1901), Heide v. Wallace & 
Co., 135 F. 346 (3d Cir. 1905); Viavi Co. v. Vimedia, 245 F. 289 (8th Cir. 1917). 
94. The secondary meaning (or the acquired distinctiveness) refers to the trademarks or 
trade dress’ capacity to identify the producer, which is not inherent but acquired in long-term use. 
At this stage, all trade dress are treated as not inherently distinctive. But consumers can connect 
the trade dress with the source after a long-time use. The trade dress could not be protected if the 
trade dress has no secondary meaning. For example, in Rathbone v. Champion (1911), the plaintiff 
argued that the defendant had no right to copy the nonfunctional parts. But the judge rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument by pointing out the lack of the public knowledge and the reputation of the 
plaintiff’s product, which mean that the feature had no source identifying function. 
Rathbone v. Champion Steel Co., 189 F. 26 (6th Cir. 1911). 
95. The consumer confusion is another requirement in trade dress infringement. If there is 
no likelihood of confusion, or the defendant could distinguish the sources by labeling, the 
imitation is allowed. In Coca-Cola v. Gay-Ola (1912), the judge decided that the color of the Coca-
Cola beverage was nonfunctional. But for bottled beverage, the judge allowed the defendant to 
imitate the beverage color if the defendant labeled the bottles prominently to avoid the confusion. 
However, for the beverage unbottled, on which no label can be attached, the defendant was 
forbidden to use the color. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720 (6th Cir. 1912). 
96. Comment (a) to § 742 stated, “The determination of whether or not such features are 
functional depends upon the question of fact whether prohibition of imitation by others will 
deprive the others of something which will substantially hinder them in competition.” 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §742 cmt. a (A.M. LAW INST. 1938). 
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The Restatement (First) defined aesthetic functionality in § 742, 
comment (a): “When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, 
their features may be functional because they definitely contribute to 
that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the 
goods are intended.”97 For example, a heart-shaped candy box was 
functional due to the need to use its shape to effectively compete in the 
Valentine’s Day sweets market; a distinctive printing typeface may also 
be functional in the aesthetic sense, even though other types of 
printings were also readable.98 The definition identified sales 
contribution (“When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic 
value”) as the proxy of aesthetic functionality. 
Following the Restatement (First), courts used the sales 
contribution as evidence of aesthetic functionality. For example, in 
Ainsworth v. Gill (1938), Judge Kirkpatrick emphasized that an electric 
light’s pleasing design contributed to its sales: “The design is what 
really sells it,”99 wrote the court, and changes to the design might ruin 
the product as “a sales proposition.”100 In J.C. Penny v. H.D. Lee (1941), 
the disputed trade dress was a four-in-one bib pocket with round 
corners. The court stated that it might be aesthetically functional if “it 
will contribute materially to a general sale of the goods.”101 The judge 
found that the bib pocket had a clear commercial appeal. 
The Restatement (First) also noted the overbroad application of 
aesthetic functionality might chill trade dress protection. It pointed out 
in Comment (a) of § 742 that if the goods’ marketability was solely 
caused by the product’s manufacturer’s reputation, as identified by its 
ornamentation, then the feature was not functional.102  If consumers 
bought a product solely because of the producer’s reputation/goodwill 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99.   “. . . the defendant could not possibly. . . produce something notably different from the 
plaintiff without losing something of very substantial value and affecting the performance in the 
sense that presenting an attractive appearance is part of its performance—-as it undoubtedly is.” 
Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
100.  “. . .the defendant or anyone else who wants to make a mechanically good fixture 
designed on simple, modern lines is practically driven to shallow hemisphere or dish shape, the 
rather awkward helmet shape, or something else not nearly as satisfactory as the shallow cone. 
That, in turn, means the plaintiff really gets the monopoly which he is asking under his patent.” 
Ainsworth, 26 F. Supp. at 187.  
101. JC Penney Co. v. HD Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941). 
102.  “[A] feature which merely associates goods with a particular source may be, like a 
trade-mark or trade name, a substantial factor in increasing the marketability of the goods. But if 
that is the entire significance of the feature, it is non-functional; for its value then lies only in the 
demand for goods associated with a particular source rather than for goods of a particular 
design.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §742 cmt. a (A.M. LAW INST. 1938).  
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– represented by the trade dress – this source value/advantage is not 
aesthetically functional.  Think of the Jaguar hood ornament: 
Consumers don’t buy the car because of the little ornamental statue, 
but it may signal a trusted product source, thereby influencing their 
purchase. 
However, the Restatement (First) did not explain what to do when 
a product’s marketability was partially caused by its source and 
partially by its trade dress’s attractiveness.  In response, some courts 
speculated as to the motivation of the majority of consumers. In J.C. 
Penny v. H.D. Lee (1941), the court noted that “part of plaintiff’s 
evidence naturally indicated a demand for the design as an 
identification of Lee [the plaintiff] overalls, but the testimony of most 
of the witnesses tended rather to establish a purchaser’s interest in 
obtaining the features of the design. . .”103 With this evidence, the court 
decided that the trade dress was aesthetically functional. 
Although not mentioned in Restatement (First), the availability of 
alternative designs was also considered in some cases.104 This factor 
was very important in determining aesthetic functionality, because if 
there were many alternative designs available, then protecting a single 
design would not hinder competition. 
To summarize, the three elements determining whether the trade 
dress was aesthetically functional emerged gradually during this 
period. The three elements are (1) whether the trade dress has an 
aesthetic advantage (at this time, courts use “sales contribution” as the 
proxy of the aesthetic advantage); (2) whether the alternative trade 
dresses are equally good; and (3) whether the advantage is caused by 
the product/service source’s reputation. 
C. Lanham Act (1946) to 1982 
After a long debate, trademark law was finally codified into 
federal law. The Lanham Act was a victory for trademark owners, as it 
expanded trademark rights, but it did not address functionality. After 
1946, courts continued forge ahead on their own, sometimes 
expanding and sometimes limiting functionality doctrines. 
 
103. JC Penney Co., 120 F.2d at 954 (alteration in original). 
104. Id.; Ainsworth, 26 F. Supp. at 187.  
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The aesthetic functionality doctrine peaked with Pagliero v. 
Wallace (1952), which laid out the broadest aesthetic functionality 
parameters and severely restricted trade dress protections.105 
Pagliero decided whether the defendant could imitate plaintiff’s 
chinaware pattern (see fig. 1). The court stated, “‘[F]unctional’ in this 
sense might be said to connote other than a trade-mark purpose. If the 
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success 
of the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in 
the absence of a patent or copyright.”106 Although the court used a 
different wording “commercial success”, it was consistent with the 
sales contribution standard in the Ainsworth and J.C. Penny cases 
decided before the Lanham Act. The judge found one of chinaware’s 
essential selling features was the upper surface’s attractive design. 
Trademark protection of the design would immunize the plaintiff from 
one form of imitative competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Wallace china green shadowleaf (Photograph from 
Plantdreaming (2019)) 
In one sense, the Pagliero court went farther than Ainsworth and 
J.C. Penny by disavowing the need to consider whether alternative 
designs existed.107 This enlarged the aesthetic functionality doctrine’s 
scope and likely overestimated trademark protection’s anti-
competitive consequences. If many comparable alternative designs 
existed, competition might not be hindered by the disputed design’s 
protection. 
 
105. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). 
106. Id. at 343. 
107. Id. at 344. 
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Later cases narrowed the broad functionality scope developed in 
Pagliero108 in two ways. First, courts began to question commercial 
success’s relevance in a design’s functionality. Second, some judges 
returned to the consideration of alternative designs after Pagliero. 
For example, the court in Keene v. Paraflex (1981) criticized that 
the commercial success standard in Pagliero was problematic because 
every firm wished to create appealing trade dress.109 The court tried to 
associate aesthetic functionality with specific competitive advantages 
rather than a general description of “commercial success”. The court 
captured that the disputed luminaire’s design served to match modern 
building styles (e.g. crisp clean lines). Although the court claimed that 
aesthetic functionality must be related to utility, what they actually 
focused on was context compatibility rather than utility. The court 
found ornamental features driven by context and environment to be 
aesthetically functional.110 
After Pagliero, courts also began considering alternative designs 
again to determine aesthetic functionality. In Keene, the court decided 
the design was functional due to the limited number (12 to 15 in this 
case) of alternative luminaire designs.111 In Application of Mogen David 
Wine (1964), the disputed trade dress was a wine decanter. Judge Rich, 
in the concurring opinion, rejected the aesthetic functionality claim. He 
believed competition was not hindered because so many shapes were 
available.112 
To summarize, the context compatibility test in Keene was one 
example of courts’ efforts to capture specific competitive advantages to 
verify aesthetic functionality. While the Pagliero court said it was not 
necessary to factor the presence of alternative designs into the 
aesthetic functionality analysis, later courts considered alternative 
designs anyway. All these changes reflect the doctrine’s self-
 
108.  For cases which narrowed the functionality rule in Pagliero, 198 F.2d 339, see Keene 
Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Mogen David Wine 
Corporation, 328 F.2d 925,931-933 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1048-
1049 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982). 
109. Keene, 653 F.2d at 825. 
110. Id. at 826. 
111. Id. at 827. 
112.  Judge Rich also asserted in this case: “they [the competitors] might even excel in 
competition by producing a more attractive design under the stimulus of a prohibition against 
copying under the principles of unfair competition law”. In re Mogen David Wine, 328 F.2d at 933 
(alteration in original). This assertion implied that Judge Rich thought it was a competition among 
different designs, instead of a price competition on the same design.  
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improvement in response to the practical difficulty in diagnosing 
anticompetitive consequence of protecting trade dress. 
D. 1982 to 1990 
During this period, the landmark case of In re Morton-Norwich 
Products, Inc. (1982), a case on utilitarian functionality,113 confirmed 
that considering the availability of alternative trade dresses was 
necessary.114 This move was followed by other courts using this factor 
to determine aesthetic functionality.115 
In In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. (1982), the disputed trade 
dress was a plastic spray bottle’s shape. Judge Rich asserted that a 
utilitarian feature was not necessarily legally functional. Judge Rich 
developed the concepts of de-facto and de-jure function. “De-facto 
function” referred to usefulness in a lay sense. “De-jure function” 
meant legally functional and unprotectable because of superiority in 
function or manufacturing efficiency.116 In other words, a de-jure 
functional feature works better than alternative designs. Judge Rich 
provided four factors to decide de-jure functionality: (1) the existence 
of a utility patent; (2) advertising that touts the utilitarian advantages; 
(3) whether the design is simple or inexpensive to manufacture; and 
(4) the availability of alternative designs.117 In this case, the judge 
found the spray bottle was merely de-facto functional, holding that “a 
molded plastic bottle can have an infinite variety of forms or designs 
and still function to hold liquid. No one form is necessary or appears to 
be ‘superior.’”118 
 
113. In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
114.  In another case Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc. (1982), the Supreme Court defined a 
functional product feature as “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost 
or quality of the article.” Inwood Lab, Inc. v. Ives Lab. Inc., 456 US 844, 850 (1982). This test was 
consistent with the Restatement (First) description of the utility function. Inwood test itself did not 
include the check of the alternatives, but judges citing Inwood often checked the alternatives. 
115.  Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988); Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Sabert Corp. v. Ullman Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1597 
(1999). This trend might be influenced by changing economic views on trademark law. The 
Harvard School believed the trademark and trade dress protection enhanced the product 
differentiation and product differentiation hindered the free competition, while the Chicago 
School believed the product differentiation would not hinder the competition, and trademark and 
trade dress protection would encourage the competition instead of hindering it. In later 1980, the 
Chicago School became prevalent among scholars and accordingly influenced some judges’ 
understanding on the economic consequences of protecting an aesthetic trade dress. 
116. In re Morton-Norwich Products, 671 F.2d at 1337-1338 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
117. Id. at 1340-1342. 
118. Id. at 1342. 
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The emphasis on alternative designs in Morton-Norwich as a 
measure of whether competition might be hindered influenced later 
decisions. Courts began focusing on alternative designs’ availability 
more frequently. In Hartford v. Hallmark (1988), the disputed trade 
dress was a greeting card’s design. The judge asserted that the 
aesthetic functionality determination should rest on the availability of 
alternative appealing designs. The judge found many design 
alternatives are available for greeting cards to denote the “emotional 
non-occasion genre” and therefore the design was not aesthetically 
functional.119 
E. 1990 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
The Restatement (Third) of the Law of Unfair Competition120  
(hereinafter “Restatement (Third)”) summarized most prior case law 
related to the aesthetic functionality. First, the aesthetic functionality 
definition provided by the Restatement (Third) still connected sales 
contribution and commercial success with aesthetic functionality. In 
comment (c) of §17, functionality was found “when aesthetic 
considerations play an important role in the purchasing decisions of 
prospective consumers, a design feature that substantially contributes 
to the aesthetic appeal of a product may qualify as ‘functional.’”121 
Second, the Restatement (Third) also emphasized that a legal 
aesthetic functionality finding would be made only when alternative 
designs were limited (the assumption might be that several aesthetic 
designs were equally attractive).122 For example, the Restatement 
(Third) endorsed Keene, where the court found the alternative 
luminaire designs were limited. 123 
 
119. Hartford, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1998). 
120.  Why is the number “Third”? The Restatement (Second) of Torts was published in 1979 
and the material relating to trade practices was omitted because these subjects were gradually 
governed by legislation and divorced from the principles of torts. The American Law Institute 
started to formulate a Restatement (Third) of the Law of Unfair Competition (hereinafter 
“Restatement (Third)”) including the subject of trademarks which were published in 1990. The 
name is the Restatement (Third) to indicate the third series of revisions of the Restatements, but 
it is essentially the first Restatement of Unfair Competition.  
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1995). 
122.  “Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the aesthetic superiority of a 
particular design, a finding of aesthetic functionality ordinarily will be made only when objective 
evidence indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs. Such evidence typically is available only 
when the range of alternative designs is limited either by the nature of the design feature or by 
the basis of its aesthetic appeal.” Id. 
123. Id. (see illustrations).  
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However, the Restatement (Third) did not give a clear guide in 
cases where commercial success might be partially attributable to the 
feature’s attractiveness and partially attributable to the source’s 
reputation. In §17, the Restatement (Third) emphasized that the 
functionality should be “. . .apart from any benefits attributable to the 
design’s significance as an indication of source.”124 Comment (b) of §17 
further elaborated, “If the benefit afforded by the design resides solely 
in its association with a particular source, however, the design is not 
functional.”125 In mixed motive situations, the Restatement (Third) did 
not guide the courts in determining whether or not the feature was 
aesthetically functional.126 
F. Post-1990: Qualitex, TrafFix and other leading cases 
In Qualitex (1995), the US Supreme Court defined that a product 
was functional “if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at 
a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”127 This definition 
integrated the three elements applied in previous cases. First, “put 
competitors at a significant. . .disadvantage” implied that the disputed 
feature itself must have an aesthetic advantage. Judge Breyer pointed 
out that the disputed feature, the green-gold color of the laundry press 
pad, can hide stains.128 This was the color’s de-facto aesthetic 
 
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17. 
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17 cmt. b. 
126.  The Reporters’ Note on comment b. of §17 listed the cases of Warner v. Gay (1983), 
Vuitton v. J. Young (1981) and Boston v. Dallas (1975) to support that when the commercial 
success was caused by the reputation, the feature is not functional. But comment b. also 
mentioned another series of contrary cases, such as Job’s daughter (1980), Plasticolor v. Ford 
Motor (1991), etc. In these cases, the advantages might be also attributed to the source. However, 
the features were considered aesthetically functional. The Reporters’ Note did not provide a clear 
instruction which side was to be followed. §17 cmt. b. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 
F.2d 327 (2d. Cir. 1983); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young EnteIs., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.1981); 
Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975); 
International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Plasticolor Molded Products, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 767 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
127.The Restatement (Third) tried to distinguish the two series of cases. It stated that 
Vuitton v. J. Young (1981) and Boston v. Dallas (1975) were related to the eligibility of the design 
for protection as trademark, while Job’s daughter (1980), Plasticolor v. Ford Motor (1991), etc 
were related to “the scope of permissible use of a trademark by another” after the trade dress 
were considered a valid trademark. This distinction was arguably incoherent because the two 
series of cases were not different at this point, and all the functionality determinations were the 
defense after the validity of a trademark. See generally Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with Vanna, 47 
SCL Rev. 783 (1995) (arguing that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition did not provide 
clear instruction on trade dresses with both reputation and aesthetic attractiveness). 
128. Id. at 164. 
129. Id. at 168. 
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advantage. However, second, only having the aesthetic advantage did 
not necessarily put competitors at a disadvantage, unless alternative 
features cannot substitute the disputed feature. Judge Breyer analyzed 
that many colors can work equally well in hiding stains.129 So 
trademarking the disputed color would not impose disadvantages on 
competitors. Third, this definition explicitly claimed the disadvantage 
should be “ a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”130 
After Qualitex, many judges considered all three elements when 
determining aesthetic functionality. Another case illustrating aesthetic 
functionality’s modern treatment is Publications International, Ltd. v. 
Landoll (1998), where the disputed feature was the gold color of pages’ 
gilded edges.131 Judge Posner decided the gold color was aesthetically 
functional, since gold is used to convey luxury or opulence. While there 
were other color options, Judge Posner asserted that monopolizing a 
basic design element “impoverishes others’ palettes.”132 This meant the 
alternative colors were limited. Judge Posner also asserted that the 
competitive advantage could not be attributed to the source. He 
concluded, “a seller should not be allowed to obtain in the name of 
trade dress a monopoly over the elements of a product’s appearance 
that have value to consumers that is independent of 
identification.”133 
In Sabert v. Ullman (1999), the disputed trade dresses were gold 
and silver colors on disposable serving trays and platters.134 The court 
found the disputed colors’ advantage was that they mimicked real 
silver and gold cutlery, providing the product with a luxurious look.135 
The court found imitating real gold and silver “cannot practically be 
duplicated by the use of alternative designs.”136 The court also 
mentioned that “[i]mitation of a more luxurious product is not an 
indicator of source, but rather is of functional aesthetic value,”137 
suggesting the advantage was not related to reputation. 
To diagnose the anti-competitive consequence, courts have 
developed three elements to consider: (1) whether the trade dress 
 
130. Id. at 168.  
131. Id. at 164. 
132. Publications Intern., Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 1998). 
133. Id. at 341-344. 
134. Id. at 339. 
135. Sabert Corp. v. Ullman Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1597 (1999). 
136. Id. at 2. 
137. Id. at 3.  
138. Id. at 2. 
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conferred a de-facto aesthetic advantage on the plaintiff; (2) whether 
alternative designs could duplicate this advantage; (3) the extent to 
which the advantage was attributable to the source/reputation. The 
first and second elements improve the doctrine’s clearness by 
specifying when protecting a trade dress might hinder competition. 
The last element reduces the doctrine’s chilling effect on distinctive 
trade dress as a source indicator. Courts have made significant 
progress to compensate for the doctrine’s weaknesses. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile for courts to keep and further improve the doctrine even it 
is still not perfect. Section IV. will discuss the doctrine’s existing 
problems and propose its future direction. 
IV.     THE THREE ISSUES OF AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY 
DOCTRINE ARE EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
Recognizing the weaknesses of the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality, the courts eventually developed the three elements 
noted above. Today, while courts consistently apply these elements, 
the resulting decisions are frequently intuitive and speculative. The 
aesthetic functionality doctrine is at a crossroads; lack of direct 
empirical evidence has led to inconsistent, possibly inaccurate, proxies 
for legal determinations. Developing valid empirical methods for 
objective evidence in three elements might be the best path forward. 
A. The De-facto Advantage of Trade Dress 
Analysis begins by asking a preliminary question about the trade 
dress: Does it have a special attraction to consumers? We can think of 
this as the question of “de-facto aesthetic advantage”.138 
Courts have applied different proxies to determine de-facto 
aesthetic advantage, such as commercial success in Pagliero (1952), 
context-compatibility aesthetics in Keene (1981), or disadvantage to 
competitors in Qualitex (1995).When using these proxies, judges or 
juries try to stand in consumers’ shoes and guess whether the disputed 
trade dress is especially attractive to consumers. Relying on intuition, 
 
139.  I create a new term, “de-facto aesthetic function”, based on Judge Rich’s conception 
“de-facto (utility) function” in Morton-Norwich Products (1982). De-facto utility function refers to 
a utility in a lay sense. De-jure utility function refers to a utility in law. To have de-jure utility 
function, a design must work better than alternative designs. A design with de-facto utility 
function does not mean it is de-jure utilitarian functional. Likewise, a design with de-facto 
aesthetic function does not mean it is de-jure aesthetically functional. The de-jure aesthetically 
functional feature must be more attractive than alternative designs.  
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judges or juries might mistakenly diagnose the de-facto aesthetics in 
some cases. 
For example, in Norwich Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sterling Drug Inc. 
(1959), the Second Circuit determined that pink nausea medicine was 
aesthetically functional because pink was “pleasing” and therefore 
more acceptable to the customer. But the reasoning is relatively 
intuitive. The court did not know whether pink’s attractiveness evoked 
a higher consumer acceptance, and thus whether protecting the pink 
medicine would have anti-competitive effects. Without empirical 
studies, we do not know if the judge’s intuition was correct. 
In Louboutin v. YVES (2012), the Second Circuit rejected the district 
court’s decision that a red sole on a woman’s shoe style was 
aesthetically functional.139 The judge reversed the trial court’s decision 
that red is aesthetically functional per se in the fashion industry. 
Neither the trial judge nor the appellate court cited recent relevant 
empirical research. For example, Elliot and Niesta found that men 
rated women as more attractive and sexually desirable when the 
women were viewed within a red picture border or in red clothing.140 
This study suggests that the protection of the red color on clothes or 
shoes creates a non-reputation-based advantage for Louboutin. 
Therefore, in identifying a de-facto aesthetic advantage, court 
decisions might be biased when they rely only on the judge’s or the 
jury’s instincts. Empirical methods and evidence might be helpful in 
removing the bias. 
Taking color trademarks as the example, I suggest three empirical 
methods to diagnose the de-facto aesthetic advantage: existing 
industrial reports, data mining and consumer surveys. 
Industrial reports on consumer color preference are practically 
obtainable in some industries. For example, coating companies, such as 
PPG industrials, Inc. (“PPG”), Axalta Coating Systems Ltd. (“AXALTA”), 
BASF SE (“BASF”) and DuPont,141 provide color popularity reports (See 
Tables 1- 3). The data is based on the number of cars manufactured in 
each color.142 
 
140. Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
141.  Andrew J., Elliot & Daniela Niesta, Romantic Red: Red Enhances Men’s Attraction to 
Women, 95 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL.1150 (2008).  
142.  DuPont’s annual color reports on cars after 2013 are not available online, so we do not 
list DuPont’s data in this article. 
143.  Matthew Paula, FORBES, Top 10 Most Popular Car Colors, Forbes (December 21, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewdepaula/2012/12/21/top-10-most-popular-car-
colors/#4fa87a0e7c80. 
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Table 1. Market share of different colored cars in North America (2013-2018)—Axalta 
 white black grey silver red blue brown/
beige 
yellow/g
old 
green other 
2018 29% 18% 16% 12% 9% 8% 4% 1% 1% 2% 
2017 27% 20% 16% 12% 9% 10% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
2016 25% 21% 16% 11% 10% 8% 4% 2% 2% 1% 
2015 27% 20% 14% 12% 11% 8% 3% 2% 2% 1% 
2014 25% 19% 13% 13% 12% 7% 5% 2% 2% 2% 
2013 26% 20% 13% 14% 9% 7% 5% 2% 2% 2% 
Source: Data from Axalta (2013-2018) 
 
Table 2. Market share of different colored cars in North America (2013-2018)—
PPG 
 white black grey silver red blue natural brown green orange 
2018 26% 19% 18% 13% 11% 9% 3% N/A 1% N/A 
2017 25% 21% 17% 13% 10% 10% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2016 25% 19% 12% 19% 10% 10% 4% N/A 1% N/A 
2015 23% 19% 17% 15% 10% 8% 6% N/A 2% N/A 
2014 23% 18% 16% 15% 10% 9% 7% N/A 2% N/A 
2013 21% 19% 17% 15% 11% 9% 6% N/A 2% N/A 
2012 21% 19% 16% 16% 10% 8% 4% 2% 3% 1% 
2011 20% 18% 15% 19% 9% 9% gold/beige 
4% 
2% 2% 1% 
Source: Data from PPG (2012-2018) 
 
 
Table 3. Market share of different colored cars in North America (2017-2018)—
BASF 
 white black grey silver red blue brown green orange gold 
2018 28% 19% 17% 13% 12% 9% 2% N/A N/A N/A 
2017 28% 20% 15% 12% 11% 9% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Source: Data from BASF (2017-2018) 
 
These reports have been extremely consistent regarding color 
trends for several years. Litigants might search for these kinds of 
industrial reports online to diagnose whether a color might have the 
de-facto aesthetic functionality. 
However, many industries do not have color popularity reports. 
This article suggests mining the data on shopping websites to diagnose 
the de-facto aesthetic advantage. Online shopping has become a 
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substantial part of the retailing business. Data mining on shopping 
websites can provide market data for many products. 
Litigants might mine data on the Amazon shopping website, which 
is the largest online retailing platform in the U.S.143 The Amazon 
website provides search filters such as brand, price, and color (see Fig 
2). Litigants can use the color filter to obtain the number of sellers who 
are selling each colored product on Amazon. 
  
Figure 2. Amazon search webpage (www.amazon.com) 
For example, litigants might select the product category “cell 
phones”.  Next, they choose different color filters to obtain the number 
of sellers selling each colored smartphones on Amazon. Table 4 shows 
the results. Based on this data, Litigants/judges can get the 
approximate market share of each color (See Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Number of items (sellers) of different colored smartphones sold on 
Amazon in 2019 
 Black White Gold Grey Silver Yellow Blue Green Red Pink Orang Brown Purple 
Items 177 68 25 24 19 10 9 5 4 4 1 1 1 
Percents 50% 19% 7% 7% 5% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
 
Source: Data mined on Amazon.com. 2019 
 
Lastly, if industrial reports and data mining are not available, 
litigants might conduct a consumer survey. In the survey, litigants 
could develop an online shopping scenario, in which the disputed 
product is presented with different color choices, including the 
disputed color at the same price. The participants will choose the one 
they want to buy. If participants choosing the disputed color are 
significantly more than those choosing other colors, it means the 
disputed color might have the de-facto aesthetic advantage. 
 
144.  Amazon is the largest online retailer in the US and its website contains massive 
amounts of information, including color data, on goods offered for sale. E-Marketer editor, 
Amazon Now Has Nearly 50% of US Ecommerce Market, eMarketer (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.emarketer.com/content/amazon-now-has-nearly-50-of-us-ecommerce-market. 
AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY AT A CROSSROADS 5/29/2020  6:59 PM 
388 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.  Vol 19:3 
B. The Availability of Alternative Designs 
When trademark protection is claimed for a trade dress, the 
likelihood of anti-competitive consequences is reduced when 
substitutes remain available to competitors. However, courts 
frequently lack direct evidence to evaluate the substitutability between 
one trade dress and its alternatives. In many cases, judges simply 
assume that the alternatives are substitutable to the disputed feature. 
In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg, Corp. (1982), the Third Circuit 
held that the colors on the six facets of a puzzle cube were not 
aesthetically functional because there were “various manufacturers’ 
puzzle cube versions marked with numbers, domino designs, and 
pictures of fruit . . . a wide variety of colors, shapes and markings which 
could be used to differentiate the faces of a cube puzzle.”144 However, 
consumers who choose the six-color version might not be willing to 
accept other versions. The different versions of puzzle cubes might not 
substitute each other in consumer minds. 
The Restatement (Third), suggested courts should do more than 
merely make assumptions about alternatives: “Because of the 
difficulties inherent in evaluating the aesthetic superiority of a 
particular design, a finding of aesthetic functionality will be made only 
when objective evidence indicates a lack of adequate alternative 
designs.”145 This reference to “objective evidence” pointed directly to 
the potential relevance of an empirical approach. 
A consumer survey might evaluate the substitutability of 
alternative trade dresses. To save the litigation costs, the survey can be 
designed to test both the de-facto aesthetic advantage mentioned in 
Section III.A and the substitutability. Take color trademarks again as an 
example, the litigants might propose colors that can substitute the 
disputed color, as many as possible. The survey will show participants 
the proposed colors and the disputed color on the disputed product at 
the same price. Participants will choose one color they want to buy. 
This step can show the de-facto aesthetic advantage of the disputed 
color. 
Then, if a participant chooses the disputed color, the survey will 
tell her the alternative colors have a 5% discount.146 If she goes back 
 
145. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982). 
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
147.  5% price difference is considered as a small but significant and non-transitory increase 
in price (SSNIP). In antitrust law, the SSNIP test is used to identify the relevant market, consisting 
of a list of goods that might substitute the investigated product. In the proposed consumer survey, 
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and chooses other colors, it means the alternative color can substitute 
the disputed color and, consequently, might overcome the disputed 
color’s pricing power. If she sticks to the disputed color at a higher 
price or does not buy any color, it means that alternative colors cannot 
substitute the disputed colors. Therefore, trademarking the disputed 
color would hinder competition because deadweight loss occurs due to 
the higher price or unsatisfied demands.147 
Having discovered some substitutes, judges might still have 
difficulty in ascertaining the anti-competitive costs, because judges 
cannot be certain of how many comparable alternatives would be 
enough to overcome possible anti-competitive consequences. 
In many cases, courts found no anti-competitive cost where there 
was an “infinite,” “wide variety,” “various,” or “a great variety.”148 But 
how many alternative designs is enough? At least one court was 
satisfied when the plaintiff provided three alternatives. In Sicilia v. Cox 
(1984), the trademark owner prevailed by offering only three other 
citrus juice products with a lemon/lime shape.149 However, the Keene 
court was not satisfied when there were 12-15 substitutes.150 In Eco v. 
Honeywell (2003), however, the trademark owner retained protection 
when he provided pictures of around 50 other thermostats with 
different shapes. 151 
Because of the contextual differences of various cases, it is 
impossible to establish a magic number of alternative designs 
necessary to overcome the anti-competitive consequence. With more 
than 100 players in an industry, such as the luminaire industry in 
Keene, 12-15 substitutes might be insufficient. But in an industry with 
4 or 5 main players, such as the gas or air industries, 15 substitutes 
 
I use a 5% price increase/decrease to test the substitutability of the alternative trade dresses. 
Gregory Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST LAW REVIEW, 253 (2003).   
148.  Lee Burgunder also proposed a similar experiment to test substitutability of colors. Lee 
Burgunder, Trademark Registration of Product Colors: Issues and Answers, 26 Santa Clara L. Rev. 
581 (1986). 
149.  For example, in Hartford v. Hallmark (1988), Judge McKay asserted the number of 
alternative designs for emotional non-occasion greeting cards were infinite, and therefore the 
disputed design was not functional.  In Ideal v. Plawer (1982), the court found that the aesthetic 
functionality did not exist because a “wide variety” of colors and shapes can be used in cubic 
puzzles.  
150. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984). 
151. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981).  
152. Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 357 F. 3d 649, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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might be enough.152 Two types of empirical data might help judges 
make the decision: (1) the number of competitors in an industry, and 
(2) the number of designs having been claimed as trademarks. The 
number of players by sector can be obtained from the website of 
the United States Census Bureau (USCB).153 
Regarding the number of designs having been claimed as 
trademarks, the database of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) might be a source to explore.154 For example, how 
many colors have been claimed on the soles of shoes? Litigants can get 
the data by entering several search codes in the search engine of  
“Word and/or Design Mark Search (Free Form)“.155 They will get color 
trademarks that have been registered or pending for registration (See 
Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Color trademarks claimed on shoe bottoms which have been registered or applied in 
USPTO 
Colors Trademarks Registration or 
Serial number 
Owner Filing 
date 
 
290301 Red or Pink 
 3361597 (Registrant) 
Christian 
Louboutin 
Individual  
March 
27, 2007 
 88491643 (Applicant) Texi 
Boots Limited 
Liability 
Company  
June 27, 
2019 
290302  Brown  
No trademarks are registered or applied 290303  Blue 
290304  Gray or silver 
290305  Violet or purple 
 
153.  Market power might exist in a market with 4 or 5 players, but the market power is not 
caused by trade dress protection discussed here.  
154.  Statistics of U.S. Businesses, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/statistics-of-us-
businesses-susb, (last visited December 12, 2019). 
155.  Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), 
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4810:ayw4vq.1.1 (last visited December 
12, 2019). 
156.  The code “290301-290309[DC]” represents all the colors on a portion of products or 
items used in rendering services. [DC] means “design code”. “29” refers to color trademarks, “03” 
means colors on the portions of product or items used in rendering services. The last two digits 
from “01” to “11” cover 11 color categories in the database: 01 red or pink, 02 brown, 03 blue, 04 
gray or silver, 05 violet or purple, 06 green, 07 orange, 08 yellow or gold, 09 white, 10 clear or 
translucent and 11 black. By the code SHOE [DD], litigants can further narrow the results within 
color trademarks related to shoes. [DD] means design description. See TESS Help Menu, 
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=help&state=4810:1qxkya.1.1#Design_Search_Code. 
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290306  Green 
 3659582 (Registrant) 
Donald J. Pliner 
Concepts, Inc. 
Corporation  
August 
20, 2008 
 4948245 (Registrant) Djp 
Concepts Ip Sub, 
Llc  
July 14, 
2015 
290307 Orange     
 
290308 Yellow or gold 
 4523674 (Registrant) 
Sewell, Payden 
Individual  
October 
25, 2013 
290309 White  
No trademarks are registered or applied 290310 Clear or 
translucent 
290311 Black 
Source: Data from USPTO. 2019 
 
Table 5 reveals that the alternative colors available on the sole of 
shoes are very limited. There are only six unoccupied color categories: 
blue, gray/silver, violet/purple, orange, white, clear/translucent. Black 
and brown are practically unavailable because trademark examiners 
are likely to reject the two colors since they are natural colors of shoe 
soles and cannot identify the producers. In addition, one might argue 
that firms can register many different shades in each color category. 
This is possible in theory but not necessarily in practice. Trademark 
examiners have rejected many shades within the same color category 
because consumers cannot distinguish between shades.156 Citing a 
yellow color trademark on the soles (Reg. No. 4523674), examiners 
refused a gold shade on the same portion of shoes (Serial 
No.86847147). 
 
157.  For example, one examiner cited a registered dark green (Reg. No. 3659582) to reject a 
light shade of green (Serial No. 85335704). Another examiner cited a registered yellow shade 
(Reg. No. 4523674) to refuse a gold shade (Serial No. 86847147). See Official Action on U.S. 
Trademark Application No. 85335704 (November 17, 2012), 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85335704&docId=OOA20121117200311#doc
Index=1&page=1; Official Action on U.S. Trademark Application No. 86849147 (May 18, 2016), 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn86847147&docId=OOA20160518163032#doc
Index=1&page=1. 
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C. Mixed-use cases: When Competitive Advantage is related to 
Reputation 
An example can easily illustrate this problem. Bob sells bright 
green, alligator-shaped toothbrushes. Eighty percent of consumers buy 
the toothbrush because it is cute. Twenty percent of consumers buy it 
because they know only Bob sells high quality toothbrushes and he has 
a great reputation with dentists. How should a court balance the need 
for a competitor to attract consumers in this market with the need to 
protect Bob’s reputation? 
Some courts struck a balance by allowing defendants to attach 
their own names/labels on the trade dress to prevent consumer 
confusion. In Flagg v. Holway, the court decided that the defendant 
could make the zither in the same design, with the plaintiff, as long as 
the defendant clearly marked their products to avoid confusion.157 
Buccafusco, Lemley and Masur also asserted that companies should 
rarely reply on trade dress protection to prevent confusion when they 
can easily apply a mark to their products.158 
However, where a plaintiff’s trade dress is very famous such as 
Louboutin’s red sole and Louis Vuitton’s monogram canvas print (see 
Fig. 3), judges tend to favor the plaintiff and disallow the imitation.159 
They often reverse the trial courts’ decisions that the disputed trade 
dress is aesthetically functional. For example, in Vuitton v. J. Young 
(1981), the disputed trade dress was the design of a mustard-color logo 
arranged on a dark brown background (see Fig. 3). The court found 
that Vuitton’s design appealed to consumers, but asserted that “a 
consumer’s interest in the prestige afforded by carrying a certain bag 
may overshadow that person’s sense for the purely aesthetic.”160 The 
court assumed that if a product had a high reputation, the consumer 
motivation driven by the trade dress’ pure aesthetic respect could be 
ignorable. However, no empirical studies have supported this 
assumption. 
 
158. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (1901). 
159.  Christoper Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley, and Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 
68 DUKE L.J. 75 (2018).  
160.  In these cases, labeling the defendant’s product can avoid consumer confusion but not 
post-sale confusion, which might be the real concern to famous trade dress.  
161. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young EnteIs., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.1981). 
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Figure 3. Monogram canvas print (Photograph from Louis Vuitton 
Authentication Guide (2018)) 
In many cases, both consumer motivations co-exist in purchasing 
products with famous designs: the motivation of having a prestige 
branded product and the motivation of having an aesthetic design. 
Courts are lack of tools to figure out the proportion of each motivation.  
Consumer surveys can help courts to get the proportions of both 
motivations. This article suggests a consumer survey based on the 
survey in Section IV. B. Litigants might add one more step to the 
previous survey in Section IV. B. Those participants choosing the 
disputed color without discount will see one confirmation page before 
they pay. The confirmation page shows an enlarged image of the 
product. At the enlarged image, the defendant’s name/label presents 
saliently on the product without ruining the product’s appealing 
appearance. The participants will choose between “pay for the 
product” and “I would not buy”. The percentage of participants 
choosing “I would not buy” indicates the proportion of consumers who 
buy the product because of the reputation, while those choosing “pay 
the product” represent the proportion buying the product for pure 
aesthetic trade dress. 
Knowing the proportion of motivations cannot solve the problems 
in mixed-motivation cases entirely. Consumer surveys only provide 
information for judges. But with information revealed by consumer 
surveys, judges would determine whether a trade dress is aesthetically 
functional on solid evidence. 
To summarize, courts eventually developed three elements when 
applying the aesthetic functionality doctrine: the de-facto aesthetic 
advantage conferred by the trade dress, the availability of alternative 
designs, and the advantage attributable to the source. Courts’ 
consideration of each element has suffered similar issues with lack of 
empirical evidence. This indicates the best future direction is to frame 
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valid empirical methods and evidence to prove or disprove the three 
elements. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
Commentators and judges criticized the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine for the lack of a clear test, and the doctrine’s threat to 
distinctive trade dress as source indicators. This article argues that 
courts should keep this doctrine because the monopoly concern 
commands the necessity of doctrine. In addition, in response to the two 
criticisms, courts have developed three elements (inquiries) to 
determine when a trade dress is aesthetically functional. First, courts 
ask whether the trade dress had a de-facto aesthetic advantage that 
attracts consumers. Second, they determine whether alternative trade 
dresses were sufficient and can substitute the disputed trade dress. 
Third, they discern whether the attraction was due to the 
manufacturer’s reputation, as indicated by the trade dress, or pure 
aesthetics. The first and second elements improve the doctrine’s 
clearness by specifying when the competition is hindered, while the 
last element reduces the doctrine’s chilling effect on distinctive trade 
dress. 
However, when analyzing the three elements in specific cases, 
courts rely on the intuitions of judges. But in fact these three elements 
are NOT about how judges feel but about how consumers feel. 
Therefore, empirical methods are necessary to improve the accuracy of 
aesthetic functionality determinations. The article proposes several 
empirical methods to address existing problems (Table 6): 
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Table 6. The Proposed Empirical Methods  
The three elements   Empirical methods 
(1) Diagnosing the de-facto 
aesthetic advantages 
 Existing 
industrial 
reports 
Data 
mining on 
public 
shopping 
websites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
consumer 
survey 
 
(2) Evaluating 
alternative 
trade 
dresses 
 
Substitutability 
   
 
Sufficiency 
 Existing data 
from US 
Census 
Bureau and 
USPTO 
(3) Discerning whether the 
attraction is due to the 
reputation or pure aesthetics 
   
 
To diagnose the de-facto aesthetic advantages, litigants might 
collect existing industrial reports and conduct data mining on public 
shopping websites. When the two methods are not available, a 
consumer survey might help to reveal the de-facto aesthetic 
advantages. 
Further, the alternative designs’ substitutability might also be 
tested through a consumer survey. Regarding how many alternative 
designs are sufficient to overcome anti-competitive consequences, 
litigants might consider data about the number of existing players 
from the US Census Bureau and the number of claimed trade dresses in 
the USPTO database. 
Finally, litigants might carry out a consumer survey to more fully 
comprehend consumer motivations. With this knowledge, judges can 
better understand whether the attraction is due to the reputation of a 
trade dress or its pure pleasing appearance. Litigants can integrate the 
foregoing surveys into one to save litigation costs. 
These proposed empirical methods are still not well-developed and 
it is not the purpose of this article to build sophisticated empirical 
methods. This article aims to reveal that the empirical approach is 
likely to address the existing problem, so it is worthy to keep this 
doctrine and improve it by developing good empirical methods in the 
future. 
